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CRIMINAL LAW AND/AS POLITICAL THEORY
Stephen Galoob*
VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
(OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 288. HARDCOVER $99.00.
ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY (HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 2018). PP. 240.
HARDCOVER $35.00.

INTRODUCTION: CRIMINAL LAW AND POLITICAL THEORY
How, if at all, do core questions of political philosophy (such as the legitimacy of
WKHVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\DQGWKHFRQWRXUVRIDMXVWVRFLHW\ PDWWHUWRWKLQNLQJDERXWFULPLQDO
law? Roughly, most criminal law theorists over the past sixty years have answered this
question in one of two ways.
Approach 1 sees criminal law as distinct from political theory. Fundamental
questions about the former do not depend on insights from the latter. The logic of this
position is encapsulated in the following passage from an eminent scholar:

Approach 1 is the predominant position among theorists in what Michael Davis has
FDOOHGWKH³JROGHQKDOIFHQWXU\´RIFULPLQDOODZtheory.2 Often, those who adopt Approach
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Erin Kelly for their feedback on a prior version of this review. Thanks also to Chad Flanders, whose curiosity
inspired this review and whose modesty precluded him from taking credit as a co-author. This work is supported
in part by a summer research grant from the University of Tulsa College of Law.
1. Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Mathematician, the Monk, and the Militant: Reflections on the Role of
Criminal Law Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 705, 707 (2000). The notion that punishment theory bears no necessary
relationship to political theory is shared by many other commentators. See, e.g., Michael Davis, Punishment
Theory’s Golden Half Century: A Survey of Developments from (About) 1957 to 2007, 13 J. ETHICS 73, 97 (2009)
(³The problems of understanding punishment do not seem to change much because of who (or what) administers
the institution. That seems a good reason not to require a theory of punishment to explain the role of government
in punishment.´).
2. Davis, supra note 1, at 73±74. Among those who adopt Approach 1 are LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY
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[P]olitical philosophy²the theory of the state²is for the most part unimportant for purposes
of doing work in criminal law theory. . . . Good work in criminal law theory must suggest
paths to resolving concrete problems that can be taken from one or several of the plausible
political starting points. But there is rarely mileage to be gained, in terms of criminal law
theory, from sorting out which is the appropriate theory of the state.1
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1 construe their project as vindicating the internal or immanent logic of criminal law, 3
RULHQWLQJ WKHLU DQDO\VLV DURXQG TXHVWLRQV VXFK DV ³ZKDW LV WKH PRUDO MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU
FULPLQDOSXQLVKPHQW"´DQG³KRZPXFKVKRXOGDQRIIHQGHUEHSXQLVKHG"´4 Even theorists
who take opposing positions in these debates are nevertheless united in their embrace of
Approach 1.5
Approach 2 sees criminal law fundamentally as a topic in political philosophy. On
this approach, as George FOHWFKHUFRQWHQGV³Whe first question that must be asked is . . .
>Z@KDWPDNHVLWOHJLWLPDWHIRUWKHVWDWHWRPDNHSHRSOHVXIIHU"´6 In other words, criminal
justice institutions not only invite the same questions about coercion and legitimacy that
apply to other political institutions, but also call for evaluation via generally-applicable
(rather than domain-specific) principles of political justification.7
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KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAW 6 (2009) (³When we say that [one
who chooses to violate legal norms deserve punishment], we are invoking the reactive attitude that punishment
of a certain amount is a fitting response to the choice. Thus, the criminal law both creates and reflects value by
announcing which conduct is sufficiently wrong to deserve blame and punishment.´); MICHAEL MOORE,
PLACING BLAME: A GENERAL THEORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 33 (1997) (³My own theory [of criminal law] is
that criminal law is a functional kind whose function is to attain retributive justice.´); VICTOR TADROS, THE
ENDS OF HARM: THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 23 (2011) (³[T]his book defends the view that
punishment can be justified only in virtue of its instrumental value. But it does so in the light of a nonconsequentialist view of morality.´).
3. Compare Stephen Morse, Compatibilist Criminal Law, in THE FUTURE OF PUNISHMENT 107, 131
(Thomas A. Nadelhoffer ed., 2013) (distinguishing between internal and external challenges to practices of
criminal responsibility and contending that, because ³[t]he criminal law is the product of centuries of
development,´ the ³burden of persuasion´ in critiquing these practices ³is surely on the external challengers´),
with ALAN BRUDNER, PUNISHMENT AND FREEDOM: A LIBERAL THEORY OF PENAL JUSTICE 14 (2009) (³Were
we to understand penal law solely with reference to conceptions of freedom internal to it, we would perhaps have
achieved a faithful understanding; but we would not have justified the law as having normative force for anyone
but those already committed to those conceptions.´).
4. See, e.g., MOORE, supra note 2, at 30 (³The first question of a theory of the criminal law is the question
of why we punish.´); Andrew von Hirsch, Proportionality in the Philosophy of Punishment: From “Why
Punish?” to “How Much?”, 25 ISR. L. REV. 549 (1991).
5. In debates about punishment theory, for example, retributivists and their critics often adopt Approach 1.
Compare Mitchell N. Berman, Punishment and Justification, 118 ETHICS 258, 260 (2008) (stating theories of
punishment ³are moral claims in response to the proposition that punishment stands in need of justification. If
theories of punishment are thus situated ab initio within an argumentative dialectic, one might expect their
persuasiveness to depend, in part, on how fully and satisfactorily they understand the proposition to which they
aim to respond.´), with Russell L. Christopher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of Just Punishment, 96
NW. U. L. REV. 843, 975 (2002) (³Unless retributivism departs from the formula of desert as the sole justification
for punishment, it is circular or empty. But once retributivism departs from desert as the sole justification for
punishment by resorting to consequences, and since the consequences may be obtained by punishing an offender
without desert, retributivism is subject to the very same problems of consequentialist theories²justifying
intentional punishment of particular, identifiable innocents and the use of offenders as mere means.´).
6. George P. Fletcher, The Nature and Function of Criminal Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 687, 697±98 (2000).
7. Perhaps the most prominent exemplar of Approach 2 is JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PHILIP PETTIT, NOT JUST
DESERTS: A REPUBLICAN THEORY OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1990). Other works adopting Approach 2 include
Corey Brettschneider, The Rights of the Guilty: Punishment and Political Legitimacy, 35 POL. THEORY 175
(2007); Sharon Dolovich, Legitimate Punishment in Liberal Democracy, 7 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 307 (2004);
Chad Flanders, Punishment, Liberalism, and Public Reason, 36 CRIM. J. ETHICS 61 (2017); Alice Ristroph, The
Thin Blue Line from Crime to Punishment, 108 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 305 (2018); TOMMIE SHELBY, DARK
GHETTOS: INJUSTICE, DISSENT, AND REFORM (2016); Malcolm Thorburn, Criminal Law as Public Law, in
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 21 (Antony R. Duff & Stuart P. Green eds., 2011); Ekow N.
Yankah, Republican Responsibility in Criminal Law, 9 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 457 (2015).
As with nearly all dichotomies, the one described in the text is false. Some theorists take an intermediate approach
on which political theory entails criminal law theory, or vice versa. For some, theorizing about criminal law
serves to illustrate or vindicate an antecedently preferred political theory. See CHRISTOPHER HEATH WELLMAN,
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The lines delineating these two approaches are permeable. Many criminal law
theorists have taken more than one approach over the course of their careers 8 and, indeed,
within the same work.9 What, if anything, hangs on theorizing from one of these
approaches rather than the other?
9LQFHQW &KLDR¶V Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State and Erin
.HOO\¶V The Limits of Blame: Rethinking Punishment and Responsibility are both
specimens of Approach 2, albeit to varying degrees. Both works demonstrate how
theorizing criminal law as a subset of political theory is likely to differ from the
predominant position.
I. CHIAO ON CRIMINAL LAW AS PUBLIC LAW
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RIGHTS FORFEITURE AND PUNISHMENT (2017); A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, 20 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 311 (1991). As Michael Davis noted regarding fairness-based theories of punishment, those who take
this approach adopt a theory of punishment ³because it fits a moral (or political) theory that is their main focus.´
Davis, supra note 1, at 94.
8. For example, Gideon Yaffe¶s work on attempts analyzes the criminalization of attempts along the lines
of Approach 1. See GIDEON YAFFE, ATTEMPTS: IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ACTION AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (2010).
However, Yaffe¶s work on the justification for punishing juvenile offenders less than adult offenders ultimately
offers a political resolution consonant with Approach 2: that legal institutions have lesser legitimacy over juvenile
offenders ³because of the political meaning of age.´ GIDEON YAFFE, THE AGE OF CULPABILITY: CHILDREN AND
THE NATURE OF CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY 125 (2018).
9. As discussed below, the first four chapters of Erin Kelly¶s The Limits of Blame might be construed as
adopting Approach 1, while the remainder of the book clearly takes Approach 2.
10. VINCENT CHIAO, CRIMINAL LAW IN THE AGE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE vii (2018).
11. Id. at viii.
12. Id. at 51.
13. Id. at 56.
14. Id. at 37.
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&KLDR¶VERRNSURYLGHVWKHPRVWVXVWDLQHGDQGIRUFHIXOGHIHQVHWRGDWHRIFRQVWUXLQJ
FULPLQDO ODZ DV D WRSLF LQ SROLWLFDO WKHRU\ &KLDR FRQWHQGV WKDW ³FULPLQDO ODZ DQG LWV
associated institutions are . . . subject to the same principles of institutional and political
HYDOXDWLRQWKDWDSSO\WRSXEOLFODZDQGSXEOLFLQVWLWXWLRQVJHQHUDOO\´ 10 Therefore, Chiao
DUJXHV WKHRULHV RI FULPLQDO ODZ VKRXOG DLP WR ³OLYH XS WR D IXOO\ SROLWLFDO VWDQGDUG RI
MXVWLILFDWLRQ´11 UDWKHUWKDQHQGHDYRULQJWRFDSWXUHRUUHIOHFW³WKHQRUPVRILQWHUSHUVRQDO
PRUDOLW\´12
&KLDR¶VFRUHDUJXPHQWUHVWVRQVHYHUDOLQVLJKWV&KLDR¶VILUVWLPSRUWDQWSRLQWLVWR
GHIHQGZKDW DIWHU0DOFROP7KRUEXUQ KHFDOOVWKH³SXEOLFODZ´XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIFULPLnal
ODZ WKH QRWLRQ WKDW WKH ³same HYDOXDWLYH VWDQGDUG VKRXOG DSSO\´ WR FULPLQDO ODZ
institutions as applies to other political or social institutions that engage in coercive rule
enforcement.13 For Chiao, the case for the public law understanding follows from
DSSUHFLDWLQJWKHUROHRIFULPLQDOODZLQ³VWDELOL]>LQJ@DSXEOLFVHQVHRIMXVWLFHE\SURYLGLQJ
assurance that cooperation with legal rules will not leave one open to victimization or
H[SORLWDWLRQ´14 The public law understanding also addresses a series of problems that are
raised by the US case of Deshaney v. Winnebago Cty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.: namely,
whether criminal law institutions should be assessed in isolation and construed as
condemning wrongful or harmful actions ex post, or whether they should be assessed based
on their contribution to the protection of moral entitlements (which requires appraising
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15. CHIAO, supra note 10, at 247±48.
16. Id. at 28.
17. Id. at 256.
18. Id. at 32±33.
19. Id. at 72. In describing the anti-deference conception, Chiao invokes the work of Elizabeth Anderson,
Niko Kolodny, and (most importantly) Phillip Pettit.
20. CHIAO, supra note 10, at 73.
21. Id. at 77.
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id. at 90.
24. Id. at 96.
25. In chapter four, Chiao contends that any adequate theory of punishment ³must be open to considering the
aggregate costs and benefits of a system of punishment´ and have the resources to criticize excessively punitive
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them in continuity with other social and political institutions). 15 The public law
understanding strongly favors the latter.
This public law understanding contrasts with the notions, predominant among
criminal law theorists, that the goal of criminal law is to vindicate private rights and that
the legitimacy of criminal law is a question of whether criminal punishments track
offHQGHUV¶GHVHUW16 However plausible such deontological and/or retributivist approaches
are as a description of interpersonal morality, Chiao argues, they are implausible as
SROLWLFDO PRUDOLW\ EHFDXVH WKH\ DUH ³DQWLGHPRFUDWLF LOOLEHUDO UHVHQWIXO DQG PRUH
concerned with the righteousness of those who punish than with the interests of those who
DUHPDGHWREHDULWVFRVWV´17 They also cannot appreciate the Deshaney problems because
they assess criminal justice institutions largely in isolation from other political and social
institutions.18
To see criminal law as a species of public law is to embrace Approach 2. Yet, Chiao
concedes, identifying the appropriate connection between criminal law and political theory
does not establish the content of criminal law²that is, the specific goals that criminal law
institutions should pursue and the means by which they should pursue them. To begin
resolving these questions, Chiao articulates a substantive theory of criminal law based on
the ideal of democratic egalitarianisPRU³DQWL-GHIHUHQFH´19 DFFRUGLQJWRZKLFK³SXEOLF
LQVWLWXWLRQVVKRXOGVWULYHWRSURPRWHHIIHFWLYHDFFHVVWRFHQWUDOFDSDELOLW\IRUDOO´WKDWLV
consistent with assigning an equal status to all.20 This theory, in turn, grounds several
principles for evaluating criminal justice institutions, including the principles of equal
opportunity for influence (the notion that those subject to political institutions should have
³DQHTXDORSSRUWXQLW\WRZHLJKLQRQ . EDVLFSROLFLHVDQGYDOXHV´ 21 anti-subordination
(i.e. WKDW FULPLQDO MXVWLFH LQVWLWXWLRQV VKRXOG QRW EH XVHG WR ³HQWUHQFK REMHFWLRQDEOH
SDWWHUQV RI VWDWXV KLHUDUFK\´ 22 optimality (the idea that, because criminal punishment
QHFHVVDULO\ LPSDLUV DQ RIIHQGHU¶V ³VWDWXV DV DQ HTXDO´ FULPLQDO SXQLVKPHQW VKRXld be
reserved only for the most serious offenses against victims), 23 and inclusive aggregation
WKDW ³FULPLQDO MXVWLFH LQWHUYHQWLRQV´ VKRXOG EH HYDOXDWHG ³LQ WHUPV RI >WKHLU@ RYHUDOO
impact on effective access to central capabilit[ies], with priority for the interests of those
ZKRVHDFFHVVWRWKRVHFDSDELOLWLHVLVOHDVWVHFXUH´ 24
After working out the anti-deference theory and its subsidiary principles in chapters
one through three, Chiao analyzes an array of questions related to criminal justice, from
the justifiability of mass incarceration,25 WKH OHJLWLPDF\ RI FULPLQDOL]LQJ ³KDUPOHVV´
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wrongdoing and mala prohibita,26 the due process distinctions between criminal and civil
law,27 and the connection between criminal justice institutions and other social and
political institutions.28 In these chapters, Chiao offers new theoretical insights on vital
questions in ongoing debates. Chiao also spells out the incapacity of deontological and
retributive theories to appreciate the importance of many of these questions. Because of
the vitality of such questions, this incapacity suggests the need to reconsider these modes
of theorizing.
&KLDR¶VPRVWIDU-reaching contribution is to vindicate the public law understanding
of criminal law, a view that calls for a wholesale reevaluation of the predominant way of
thinking about criminal law. The public law understanding shows why theorists should
HPEUDFH$SSURDFKDQGUHMHFW$SSURDFK7KHPDJQLWXGHRI&KLDR¶VDFKLHYHPHQWFDQ
be appreciated regardless of whether one agrees with DOO RUUHDOO\DQ\ RIWKH ERRN¶V
main arguments about the cooperation-facilitating case for the public law understanding,
the anti-deference theory of criminal law, and the specific principles that derive from that
theory. Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State reorients what criminal law
theory is about and illuminates where it should go.
II. KELLY ON CRIMINAL LAW WITHOUT BLAME
(ULQ .HOO\¶V The Limits of Blame takes a different route to the conclusion that
criminal law theory is a topic in political theory. Unlike Chiao, Kelly more fully inhabits
Approach 1 before using its inadequacies to build the case for Approach 2. For Kelly,
SUHGRPLQDQWUHWULEXWLYLVWWKHRULHVRISXQLVKPHQWKROGWKDW³>W@KHVWDWHVKRXOGHQVXUHWKDW
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systems of mass incarceration (such as, ex hypothesi, the one realized in the contemporary United States). CHIAO,
supra note 10, at 112±13. ³Strictly deontological´ theories of punishment justify punishment solely in terms of
deontological considerations such as an offender¶s deservingness or forfeiture of right not to be punished. Id. at
114. These theories are inadequate to the task because they focus only on individual offenders. Id. at 130. By
contrast, the anti-deference theory can provide a basis for criticizing such a system based on its aggregate social
costs, which undermine the possibility of political equality. Id. at 138.
26. In chapter five, Chiao argues that, on the public law conception, there is no ³core´ to criminal law²that
³we should reject the idea that the criminal law is essentially prohibitory rather than regulatory in function.´ Id.
at 158. From this point, it follows that the decision whether to criminalize a pattern of conduct ³is subject to
justification under a fully political standard,´ and that ³any subject-matter-based constraints [on criminalization]
must themselves be justified under that standard, rather than as a matter of the freestanding morality of the
criminal law.´ Id. at 160. Chiao¶s thesis here differs from the conclusion, advanced by Stephen Garvey (and, as
discussed below, Kelly), that the state¶s authority to criminalize malum in se is not contingent on its political
legitimacy. See Stephen P. Garvey, Injustice, Authority, and the Criminal Law, in THE PUNITIVE IMAGINATION:
LAW, JUSTICE, AND RESPONSIBILITY 42 (Austin Sarat ed., 2014).
27. In chapter six, Chiao argues for a ³pragmatist´ approach to delineating criminal and civil law, which he
contrasts with the ³formalist´ approach that characterizes the United States Supreme Court¶s jurisprudence.
CHIAO, supra note 10, at 182±83. The main difference between these approaches is that pragmatism would apply
the more-rigorous standards of criminal due process to all matters that affect central capabilities (such as the
collateral consequences, deportation, pretrial detention, and civil commitment), while many of these topics are
deemed essentially civil under the formalist approach. Id. at 210±19.
28. In chapter seven, Chiao provides a sustained argument why, under the public law conception,
administrative states should ³often favor crime prevention,´ which implicate institutions outside of the criminal
justice system, ³over punitive response.´ Id. at 222. On Chiao¶s argument, the egalitarian state should aim for a
purely remedial criminal law. Id. at 230±31. Nor should it be agnostic between the choice between funding
institutions that aim to ³strengthen[] capacities for moral deliberation and choice´ and those that ³respond[] to
poor exercises of that agency with official forms of censure, blame, and punishment´ (or, in Chiao¶s memorable
phrasing, the choice between ³schools, now and prisons, later´). Id. at 228.
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29. ERIN KELLY, THE LIMITS OF BLAME: RETHINKING PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 17 (2018).
30. Id. at 6±7.
31. Id. at 48. The idea that standards for criminal responsibility are a more-demanding subset of moral
responsibility is widely shared among criminal law theorists. See, e.g., Antony Duff, Legal and Moral
Responsibility, 4 PHIL. COMPASS 978 (2009).
32. KELLY, supra note 29, at 18.
33. Id. at 46±53.
34. Id. at 119±20.
35. Id. at 122.
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criminals get the puQLVKPHQWWKH\GHVHUYH´29 Kelly initially shows that such retributivist
theories are inadequate on their own terms, then argues why the criminal justice system
should not be animated by blame. Rather, criminal justice institutions should aim to reduce
the harm that crime does by deterring criminal behavior, incapacitating people who pose
ongoing danger to others, addressing the causes of crime, and redressing the harm that
criminal actions create.
In chapters one through four, Kelly offers an internal critique of retributivism.
Retributivists see punishment as a kind of public blaming that offenders deserve. 30 For the
retributivist, criminal responsibility is a subset of moral responsibility, since both
categories of appraisal are based on essentially the same considerations. If anything, Kelly
contends, the blaming function of punishment requires the criteria for attributing criminal
responsibility to be more stringent than those for attributing moral responsibility, given
WKH³VHULRXVFRQVHTXHQFHVRIWKHVWLJPDRIFULPLQDOLW\´31
However, Kelly argues, this picture of the fit between criminal and moral
responsibility rings false. There is a mismatch between criminal punishment and moral
EODPHZRUWKLQHVV³WKHFULWHULDRIOHJDOJXLOWDQGSXQLVKPHQWLQRXUV\VWHP are not well
FDOLEUDWHGWRMXGJPHQWVRIEODPHZRUWKLQHVVDQGGHVHUW´ 32 Considerations that diminish or
defeat moral responsibility are often irrelevant to assessing criminal responsibility. For
example, some views attribute moral responsibility on the basis of competence. On these
views, a person with diminished moral competence might not be fully morally
blameworthy for their action. Yet existing criteria for attributing criminal responsibility
are insensitive to such considerations of diminished moral competence.33
Therefore, Kelly argues, the retributivist must take one of two problematic routes:
either embrace an implausible notion of moral responsibility (on which, for example, an
DJHQW¶VJHQHUDOFDSDFLWLHVIRUDFWLRQDQGRUVSHFLILFKLVWRU\DQGPRWLYDWLRns for action are
irrelevant) as the basis for criminal responsibility; or else deny that moral and criminal
responsibility are species of the same genus. For Kelly, neither of these routes leads to a
plausible account of retributive justice. Moreover, neither strategy would survive the
scrutiny applied to public policy in a legitimate democratic state: UHWULEXWLYLVPHLWKHU³ILW>V@
SRRUO\´ZLWKWKHH[LVWLQJFULWHULDRIFULPLQDOOLDELOLW\RUHOVHLWIDLOVWRIXOILOORXUFROOHFWLYH
REOLJDWLRQ³WKURXJKODZWRUHGUHVVYLRODWLRQVRILQGLYLGXDOULJKWV´LQYROYHGLQFULPLQDO
wrongdoing.34
Kelly articulates an alternative approach to justifying criminal justice institutions
EDVHGRQKDUPUHGXFWLRQ,QDMXVWVRFLHW\³>W@KHSUDFWLFHRISXQLVKPHQWZRXOGEHXVHG
only to prevent and to redress the harms caused by criminal wrongdoing, especially the
FULPLQDO YLRODWLRQ RI LQGLYLGXDO ULJKWV´ 35 Kelly sees harm reduction as a principle to
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animate both criminalization and punishment. 36 For Kelly, generally-applicable criteria
IRUSXEOLFMXVWLILFDWLRQZRXOGOLFHQVHWKHFUHDWLRQRIDFULPLQDOMXVWLFHV\VWHPWR³HVWDEOLVK
and sustain an effective, credible, and fair system of threats, with the aim of protecting
SHRSOH¶VEDVLFULJKWVDQGOLEHUWLHVE\LQFDSDFLWDWLQJFULPLQDOZURQJGRers, deterring crime,
UHIRUPLQJODZEUHDNHUVDQGUHGUHVVLQJKDUPV´ 37 The focus of criminal justice would be
wrongful conduct, and morally blaming offenders would play no important role.
Still, Kelly argues, this harm reduction rationale must also be constrained by
DVVHVVPHQWVRIWKHGHIHQGDQW¶VSV\FKRORJLFDODQGVRFLDOFLUFXPVWDQFHVLQFOXGLQJZKHWKHU
the defendant enjoyed a reasonable opportunity to comply with the law. 38 It should also
be constrained by background social injustices applicable in a specific case. Here, Kelly
WDNHV D PRGHUDWH DSSURDFK 6HYHUH LQMXVWLFHV XQGHUPLQH WKH VWDWH¶V DXWKRULW\ WR SXQLVK
altogether.39 By contrast, less severe injustices limit (without undermining) the legitimacy
of criminal justice institutions: under such conditions, iQGLYLGXDOV DUH ³OLDEOH WR
SXQLVKPHQWRQO\IRUDFWVWKDWDUHPRUDOO\ZURQJ´EXWQRWIRU³DFWVWKDWDUHPHUHO\OHJDOO\
SURKLELWHG´40
2QHPLJKWWDNHLVVXHZLWK.HOO\¶VVSHFLILFFRQFOXVLRQV)RUH[DPSOHLWLVXQOLNHO\
WKDW .HOO\¶V FULWLTXH RI UHWULEXWLYLVP Zill convince a thoroughgoing retributivist of the
error of their ways.41 6HFRQG D 5DZOVLDQ PLJKW TXLEEOH ZLWK .HOO\¶V KDUP UHGXFWLRQ
rationale for the criminal justice system on the grounds that it does not provide sufficient
justification for the deployment of coercion in light of the possibility of non-coercive
interventions.42 )LQDOO\ RQH PLJKW FRQWHVW .HOO\¶V PRGHUDWH FRQFOXVLRQ UHJDUGLQJ WKH
delegitimating effects of background and historical injustices. 43 Given the significant and
entrenched patterns of racial injustice that characterize contemporary Western nations, the
case for abolitionism might be stronger than Kelly (or, for that matter, Chiao) allows.
1RQHWKHOHVV.HOO\¶VERRNLVDQDFKLHYHPHQWLWPDNHVWKHFDVHIRU$SSURDFKLQWHUPV
that are too powerful for retributivists to ignore.

Suppose you are persuaded by Chiao and Kelly that criminal law theory is
fundamentally a topic in political theory. How would criminal law theory oriented around
Approach 2 differ from one oriented around Approach 1? Here are a few conjectures
LQVSLUHGE\&KLDR¶VDQG.HOO\¶VERRNV
2QHLPSOLFDWLRQLVWKHFHQWUDOLW\RIZKDWDIWHU&KLDRPLJKWEHFDOOHG³Deshaney
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36. Id. at 122±32.
37. KELLY, supra note 29, at 144.
38. Id. at 134.
39. Id. at 163.
40. Id. at 174.
41. For the retributivist, some of the force of Kelly¶s critique of retributivism might be blunted by conceding
that criminal responsibility is not a subset of moral responsibility, so that any asymmetries in attributional criteria
do not necessarily confound the retributive project. Indeed, some contend that this relationship characterizes
contemporary criminal law. See Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REV. 1511 (1992).
42. See Nathan Hanna, Liberalism and the General Justifiability of Punishment, 145 PHIL. STUD. 325 (2009).
43. See Stephen Galoob & Stephen Winter, Injustice, Reparation, and Legitimacy, in 5 OXFORD STUDIES IN
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY 65, 68±71 (David Sobel, Peter Vallentyne & Steven Wall eds., 2019).
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44. KELLY, supra note 29, at 123.
45. See A. JOHN SIMMONS, BOUNDARIES OF AUTHORITY 59±90 (2016) (discussing structural and nonstructural approaches to theorizing political legitimacy).
46. See Stephen R. Galoob, Retributivism and Criminal Procedure, 20 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 465 (2017). This
implication is somewhat in tension with the ³pragmatic´ approach to analyzing criminal procedure that Chiao
suggests in chapter six of Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State. However, any tension might be
resolved by construing instrumental and non-instrumental approaches to criminal procedure as complements,
rather than as rivals.
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SUREOHPV´ $VVHVVLQJ WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ DQG OHJLWLPDF\ RI FULminal justice institutions
requires analyzing a host of other social institutions oriented toward the provision of basic
ULJKWVDQGRSSRUWXQLWLHV$V.HOO\SXWVLW³>L@QRUGHUWRµVROYH¶WKHSUREOHPRIFULPHD
society would have to make a commitment that goes beyond criminal justice. It would
need to address the causes of crime, which is something a criminal justice system does not
GR´44 The holistic assessment needed to resolve Deshaney problems calls into question
WKH ZLVGRP H[SOLFDWLQJ WKH ³LQWHUQDO ORJLF´ RU ³LPPDQHQW PRUDOLW\´ RI FULPLQDO ODZ LQ
isolation from other principles of political morality. On Approach 2, the principles of
criminal law must, at a minimum, be compatible with the principles animating other,
related social institutions.
Second, criminal law theory involves questions of political legitimacy far more (and
in different ways) than is currently supposed. Approach 2 suggests that political legitimacy
FDQQRWEHGHULYHGVLPSO\IURPDQDVVHVVPHQWRIWKHIRUPDOSURSHUWLHVRIDVWDWH¶VSROLtical
institutions, and its criminal justice institutions in particular. 45 Rather, actual patterns of
exercising its authority (not to mention the actual distribution of political, social, and
economic resources that characterize a society) can significantl\DIIHFWDVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\
to enforce criminal law. If so, then viable theories of criminal law cannot be satisfied by
abstract inquiries concerning the point of criminalization and punishment. They should
also aim to be sensitive toward (and productive in light of) the histories of injustice and
oppression and facts about disagreement that describe our world.
Third, criminal procedure (that is, institutions of policing, adjudicating, and
punishing crime) is central to theorizing criminal law. Most straightforwardly, criminal
procedure institutions can affect the overall legitimacy of a criminal justice system,
WKHUHE\SRWHQWLDOO\DIIHFWLQJDVWDWH¶VDXWKRULW\WRFULPLQDOL]HDQGSXQLVKVSHFLILFW\SHVRU
tokens of conduct. Moreover, criminal procedure values (captured in the colloquial notion
RI ³GXH SURFHVV´  FDQ KDYH QRUPDWLYH VLJQLILFDQFH LQGHSHQGHQW RI WKHLU DFFXUDF\ 7KLV
implication suggests the non-instrumental importance of the procedures by which crime is
policed, prosecuted, and punished.46 A viable theory of criminal law, then, would need to
explain and defend how criminal procedure should go.
Both Criminal Law in the Age of the Administrative State and The Limits of Blame
are essential reading. Both books are among the most important works in criminal law
theory of the past ten years. Each offers compelling insights regarding the justification and
legitimacy of criminal punishment. Apart from these insights, both books are perhaps even
more important for what they suggest about the future of criminal law theory and (not to
mention as) political theory.

